Georgia case law updates and legal news
Edited By George Washington

The Atlanta Gleaner.

May 07, 2023.

ZABORA BROWN, Individually, & as the Nat. Parent & as next friend Antraveious Payne, ANTRAVEIOUS PAYNE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, A Mun. Corp. of the State of Georgia, MATTHEW JOHNS, Individually & in his official capacity as a Police Officer of the City of Atlanta Police Dep't, Defendant-Appellee., No. 21-13565, 2023 WL 3244833 (11th Cir. May 4, 2023)
#eleventh circuit #summary judgment #excessive force #trauma
Plaintiffs-Appellants Zabora Brown and Antraveious Payne appeal an order of the district court granting summary judgment for the Defendant-Appellee City of Atlanta (“City”). Following oral argument and a review of the record, we affirm.

On September 15, 2016, two Atlanta Police Officers spotted a black BMW with a stolen tag during their regular patrol. Officers pursued the vehicle, reaching speeds of around 110 mph and travelling on both highway and surface roads through commercial and residential areas. Officer Matthew Johns, who was assigned to a specialized unit of the Atlanta Police Department (“APD”) known as the Atlanta Proactive Enforcement and Interdiction Unit (“APEX”), heard radio calls about the pursuit. Officer Johns joined the chase when it passed his location in contravention of a direct order that no APEX officers get involved.

After about ten minutes, a Georgia State Patrol Officer became involved with the pursuit and successfully PIT maneuvered the black BMW. Once the suspects were cornered, Officer Johns moved into position to apprehend occupants of the passenger side. The occupants of the BMW exited the vehicle; without police instruction, each chose to lay face-first on the ground. Payne exited the passenger side of the vehicle.

Officer Johns ran up to Payne, kicking him in the head. Officer Johns then used his foot, lifting it vertically and stomping down on the back of Payne's head as Payne lay face down on the ground. Officer Johns knelt on Payne's back and struck him in the left side of his body while trying to handcuff him. He punched Payne again in the head with a closed left-handed fist. As Officer Johns put Payne's left wrist in handcuffs, he punched him several more times in the abdomen. Throughout this encounter, Payne did not attack Officer Johns or resist the arrest. In total, Officer Johns kicked and punched Payne in the head, neck, and torso for thirty six seconds. Dashcam footage captured most of the interactions between police and the occupants of the car immediately following the chase.

APD officers placed the suspects under arrest as other officers arrived on the scene. Within a minute of the stop, a Senior Patrol Officer arrived and saw blood on Payne's mouth and near one of his ears. She called for an ambulance to take Payne to the hospital for evaluation and treatment. Payne received injuries and abrasions to his head and face and suffered a concussion that required an overnight hospital stay.

Following the incident, a Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment against Officer Johns, charging him with four counts of aggravated assault, two counts of making false statements and writings, and two counts of violating his oath of office. Officer Johns pleaded guilty to all counts in the indictment. After accepting the guilty plea, the Superior Court sentenced Officer Johns to twenty years in prison, to serve five years.

In November 2017, Brown brought this action against the City and former APD Officer Johns, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as well as the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

  • Payne and Brown sued Officer Johns under § 1983 for excessive force and the City seeking to impose municipal liability.

  • For the municipal liability claim, Brown and Payne alleged APD officers acted pursuant to customs and practices in a manner that violated the constitutional rights of citizens.

  • They claimed the City failed to adequately train, supervise, discipline, and screen officers for hiring. The parties all moved for summary judgment.

  • The district court denied the cross motions for summary judgment on the excessive-force claims.

  • But the district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on municipal liability, concluding Plaintiffs had put forth “no evidence or ‘specific facts’ to support their sweeping” municipal liability theory.

Plaintiffs now appeal.

Brown and Payne raise two issues contending the district court: (1) erred in its interpretation and application of Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); and (2) misapplied the summary judgment standard. This Circuit reviews rulings on summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017).

Under Monell, a municipality can be liable for an employee's unconstitutional action if the action is directly caused by the municipality. 436 U.S. at 690. “[T]o impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Simple respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). It must be the execution of the government's policy or custom that causes the injury. Id. Stated otherwise, the municipal policy or custom must be “the moving force behind the [constitutional] violation.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 1998).

The deliberate indifference standard applies to a failure to train employees or properly screen new applicants. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997); Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. “Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. Failing to adequately scrutinize an applicant's background will constitute deliberate indifference “where adequate scrutiny of the applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 398. Deliberate indifference is necessary because in a broad sense, “every injury is traceable to a hiring decision.” Id. at 415.

Of the issues raised in the briefs, only three warrant in-depth discussion here.

The first is whether the City failed to adequately train its officers.

  • Brown and Payne presented two witnesses—Officer Johns and an expert witness—who they maintain create a factual question about whether officers are trained to kick and strike suspects, or whether Officer Johns's actions were a conscious choice to violate APD policy. The expert testified that the APD “regularly teaches officers to use the very physical techniques,” employed by Officer Johns and that Officer Johns “should not have been fired” because “he complied with the policies and procedures that were written by the APD.” The district court acknowledged this testimony but dismissed it because the APD, through its policies, authorizes the use-of-force techniques at issue only when the subjects resist arrest. Video evidence presented to the district court showed Payne did not resist arrest during the incident. Thus, the district court reasoned there was no genuine issue of material fact and the claim failed.

  • The district court properly rejected testimony from Officer Johns and the expert that Officer Johns was acting under APD policies and training when he used excessive force against Payne. At the time of the injury, APD policy allowed force that is reasonable and necessary to affect an arrest, to defend the officer or another from physical assault, or to accomplish lawful objectives. The video shows that Payne laid down on the ground and did not resist arrest after he exited the vehicle. No other officer on the scene used such force in the arrest—to the contrary, the Senior Patrol Officer promptly called an ambulance for Payne once she saw blood. Given the videos’ contradiction of the testimony that Officer Johns was complying with the APD's policies and procedures, the district court's conclusion that Brown and Payne could not point to a policy, practice, or custom that directly caused Payne's injuries is supported by the record. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).

Second, Brown and Payne maintain the district court erred in holding the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the APD failed to adequately investigate Officer Johns's background—specifically his military and psychological history—before hiring him. 

  • Payne and Brown maintain the APD's failure to investigate and evaluate Officer Johns for PTSD was the moving factor behind his use of excessive force.

  • The district court did not err in finding that Payne and Brown failed to present sufficient facts to support their claims. In October 2009, Dr. Joseph Hill conducted a pre-hiring psychological evaluation of Officer Johns on behalf of the APD. The psychological evaluation covered the broad functioning range of the applicant, across any disorder, and any type of dysfunction and psychological services, including PTSD. As part of his screening, Dr. Hill reviewed verified information, employment history, educational background, and military experience.

  • During his evaluation and screening, Officer Johns denied he had trouble sleeping, had intrusive thoughts, had psychological issues, or took medication for psychological issues. Officer Johns reported no PTSD symptoms to Dr. Hill during the psychological evaluation for the APD. Dr. Hill ultimately reported no indication of PTSD based on his findings from the evaluation.

  • There was no evidence the APD's screening of Officer Johns before hiring constitutes deliberate indifference. Given his responses to the psychological evaluation conducted before hiring−which screened for PTSD−his use of excessive force against Payne was not a plainly obvious consequence of the APD's decision to hire him. There is no genuine issue of material fact, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 398.

Lastly, Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the City failed to adequately supervise Officer Johns.

  • As we have established, deliberate indifference requires the supervising entity to know that enhanced supervision is needed, see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 407 (“[A municipality's] continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.”), but the record is clear that the City was not aware that Officer Johns required additional supervision. Accordingly, we conclude that the City was not deliberately indifferent as to Officer Johns's supervision.

 

AFFIRMED.

Perrault v. State, No. S23A0379, 2023 WL 3183146 (Ga. May 2, 2023)
#domestic violence #tales from the crypt
In February 2022, a jury found Michael Seth Perrault guilty of malice murder and simple battery, family violence of his wife, Amanda Perrault. On appeal, Perrault asserts that

  • (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions;

  • (2) the trial court erred in refusing to transfer the case to a different venue;

  • and (3) he is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence presented at trial showed that on January 28, 2020, Amanda went to a neighbor's house and called the Putnam County Sheriff's Office to report that Perrault had committed an act of domestic violence against her. At the time, Perrault himself was a police officer with the Eatonton Police Department. Amanda told the responding officer that she had been scared to call the police because of her husband's job, but Perrault had woken her up from a nap, called her a “whore,” and held her up against a wall and choked her.

Perrault's eight-year-old daughter, B. P., told the responding officer that when she got home from school, her father and Amanda were arguing, so she hid in her closet. She eventually came out to see what was going on and heard Amanda say, “[J]ust let me get my purse and I'll leave.” Then she saw her father push Amanda out the front door. While the officer spoke with B. P. inside, he had allowed Perrault to retrieve his ID from his car. When the officer went back outside to speak with Amanda again, he noticed that the garage door had been opened and that Amanda appeared more upset. Amanda stated that Perrault had opened the garage door and told her, “I got you now.”

Although Perrault initially denied that there had been a physical altercation, he later said he had to push Amanda out the front door because she would not leave. He later claimed that he had to push her because she was hitting him and then stated that he had to push her because she was damaging property inside the house. Although the responding officer photographed red marks on Amanda's chest, he did not observe any injuries on Perrault or any apparent damage in the home. Perrault was placed under arrest that evening for simple battery and later placed on administrative leave from the Eatonton Police Department.

Six days later, at 1:10 p.m. on February 3, 2020, Putnam County Sheriff's Deputy Terrell Abernathy went to the Perrault home to serve a witness subpoena on Perrault for an unrelated matter. Deputy Abernathy rang the doorbell, which included a camera facing the front step, several times and heard heavy footsteps moving hurriedly inside the home. However, no one came to the door, and he eventually left around 1:17 p.m. Perrault's security system showed the front door being opened at 1:24 p.m. Deputy Abernathy was dispatched back to the Perrault home at 1:36 p.m. regarding a possible suicide after Perrault called the Eatonton Police Chief, crying hysterically that his wife had killed herself.

When Deputy Abernathy arrived back at the house, Perrault was sitting on the front steps, crying and wearing gym shorts and a t-shirt. Both at the scene and on the ride to the Sheriff's Office, Perrault made several spontaneous statements, including that “he did not care if he spent the rest of his life in prison,” that “his life was over,” that it was “all his fault,” and that “his wife was trying to clear his name, but couldn't handle the stress of the media.” He also made statements that he had witnessed his wife “execute herself.”

Inside the Perrault home, officers found Amanda deceased in her bed from what appeared to be a close contact gunshot wound to the right side of her head. She was lying on her back with her hands down by her side in a cupped position. A .380 Smith & Wesson pistol was located near the left side of Amanda's feet near the footboard with a cartridge loaded in the firearm. The magazine had been removed from the pistol and was located near Amanda's right thigh. Two cartridges were found in the bedding near the footboard, and a spent shell casing was found near the bedroom door, approximately 17 feet away from where Amanda was found in the bed. Officers observed several empty bottles of Fireball whiskey on the nightstand and in a black plastic bag on the bedroom floor. Officers also located a damp towel on the closet floor and observed that Perrault smelled of soap.

When Perrault was led to Sheriff Howard Sills's office, he abruptly stopped crying for the first time. Perrault agreed to speak with Sheriff Sills about what had happened to Amanda that day; however, Perrault continuously returned to the January 28 incident, claiming that Amanda was a “liar” and that the deputies who arrested him had overreacted. His only explanation of what had happened to Amanda was that they had been lying in bed having a casual conversation when Amanda abruptly produced a gun, said, “I can't do this,” and shot herself. He claimed that she was distraught over what she had done to Perrault and his reputation after he was arrested. Perrault denied ever touching the pistol that day and initially denied touching Amanda after she shot herself, but later said, “I might have hugged the sh*t out of her. I could have touched her.” He had no explanation for why the magazine was out of the pistol when officers arrived. A gunshot residue test revealed that Perrault had one particle of gunshot primer residue on his left hand. An audio recording of this interview was played for the jury.

The GBI was called to assist in the investigation, and based on the blood evidence at the scene, Special Agent Brian Hargrove determined that Amanda was in a seated upright position in her bed when she sustained the gunshot wound to the right side of her head. The majority of the blood evidence was located on the west side wall of the bedroom; however, Amanda's blood was also found in a separate location across the house on the door-jamb to the guest bathroom. There was no blood on either of Amanda's hands or on the sleeves of the shirt Amanda was wearing.

Officers later determined that Perrault lied about his whereabouts in the hours leading up to Amanda's death. Although he claimed that he and Amanda dropped B. P. off at school and then went to a gas station on Highway 16, this was disproved by surveillance footage from another convenience store that captured Perrault entering the store wearing a Costa hat, a Pink Floyd t-shirt, and jogging pants. He left the store at 10:16 a.m. and got into the front passenger side of his truck, which was being driven by Amanda. The shirt and pants Perrault was wearing at that time were later located in the washing machine at Perrault's home.

A jailhouse informant told officers that Perrault laughed about how the officers had “f*cked up [their] own crime scene” and showed him the way he pulled back Amanda's arm to pull the trigger while she was passed out. Perrault also told him that they had gone to the store to get more Fireball and that his biggest concern was that he had been caught on camera with the clothing that was found in the washing machine and that, if he had known that, he would have done things differently.

At trial, the State called several witnesses who had observed Perrault's prior behavior toward Amanda. The Perraults’ next-door neighbor, Dawn Anderson, testified that she had overheard Perrault and Amanda have terrible, verbally abusive fights. One time she saw Amanda running up the hill toward her house while Perrault was grabbing her hair. When he let her go, Amanda fell to the ground, and Perrault then kicked her in the back and on her side. On another occasion, Anderson saw Perrault holding Amanda's hair while she was running out of the garage. Anderson also testified that Amanda came to her home one day, crying and saying that Perrault had said he was going to kill her. Amanda told her that if she were ever found dead, Anderson should make sure the police knew that she did not kill herself. On the evening of January 28, 2020, Amanda ran into Anderson's house looking for a telephone. When Amanda found Anderson's phone, she immediately called 911. Anderson saw red marks on Amanda's chest.

Another neighbor, Lula Connally, testified that she had heard Perrault and Amanda arguing many times, including on the day that Amanda was shot. Yet another neighbor, Karen Dorton, testified that whenever Perrault was home, she could hear him “raging.” At times Dorton considered calling the police, but she was intimidated because she knew that Perrault was a police officer.

One of Amanda's sisters testified that Perrault was “very demeaning” to Amanda. Amanda once told her that she had locked herself in a bedroom and put a heavy dresser in front of it after Perrault became drunk and belligerent, but Perrault kicked the door in, knocked over the dresser, and spit on her. In January 2019, Amanda sent her sister messages that Perrault had choked and kicked her and destroyed her electronic tablet. In June 2019, Amanda sent her a picture of injuries she had on her face.

Amanda's other sister also testified about Perrault's treatment of Amanda. In October 2018, Amanda told her that Perrault had grabbed her by the hair, thrown her to the floor, and choked her. In July 2019, Amanda said that Perrault had tried to choke her and had punched her in the side of the face. Amanda's adult daughter testified that she had lived with Amanda and Perrault at one point and saw Perrault verbally and physically abuse Amanda. In June 2018, Amanda told her that Perrault had once choked her until she almost passed out, pulled her off the bed by her hair, and “busted her lip.” Amanda sent her pictures showing the injuries from that incident.

B. P. testified that she had witnessed her father “shove” Amanda on January 28, 2020. A recording of B. P.’s forensic interview conducted shortly after Amanda's death was also played for the jury. During that interview, B. P. said that her father apologized to her after his January 28 arrest and asked her not to say anything about what he had done. B. P. also said that Amanda had told her that if her “real” mom found out what had happened and her father lost custody of her, he would “come shoot [Amanda] dead.”

The State also introduced video evidence from Amanda's cell phone, including a video showing Perrault screaming at Amanda while they were in their bedroom and a video of Amanda emotionally describing the abuse she had recently experienced. Her phone records showed that the morning of her death, she called the EBT office in Georgia at 8:40 a.m. and that she was searching for homes for sale throughout Putnam County the day before her death.

The medical examiner testified that she “felt that the most compelling [conclusion in her] professional judgment was that [the] manner [of death] was suicide,” but she could not say which specific findings she relied upon to make that determination. She could not recall whether she knew that agents later recovered two unfired bullets in the bedding and Perrault's clothing in the washing machine, that Perrault had allegedly told Amanda on January 28, “I got you now,” that gunshot residue was found on Perrault's hand, or that Perrault told B. P. not to say anything about what had happened on January 28. She agreed that Amanda would have been immediately incapacitated upon receiving the injury to her head and would not have been able to pull the magazine out of the gun.

Amanda's blood alcohol content level was 0.230. The toxicology panel was negative for illegal drugs, but it did not screen for all prescription medications. The jailhouse informant also told officers that Perrault had given Amanda “painkillers” all day, that she was drinking Fireball, and that she had passed out. Officers found a pill bottle in Perrault's safe in the master closet that contained several Tylenol Three pills and one Flexeril, a prescription muscle relaxer.

1. Perrault first asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of Georgia statutory law because it did not exclude every reasonable theory other than guilt. We are not persuaded.

Under Georgia's statutory law, “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. “[A]nd where the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the accused, we will not disturb that finding unless it was insupportable as a matter of law.” Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 358 (1), 882 S.E.2d 289 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, Perrault contends that the evidence did not eliminate the alternative hypothesis that Amanda committed suicide. But the evidence was more than enough for the jury to reject that hypothesis as unreasonable. The evidence showed that Perrault was angry at Amanda following his January 28 arrest and that his job and custody of B. P. were in jeopardy. Family and neighbors detailed multiple instances of prior abuse Perrault had inflicted on Amanda, as well as her expressly stated concern that he would one day kill her. The forensic evidence also showed that Amanda's blood was found across the house and her hands were cupped and positioned down by her side while the magazine was out of the gun and placed on the opposite side of her body from the gun. In addition, Perrault lied about his whereabouts the morning of the shooting, and the clothing he was wearing was found in the washing machine, a concern Perrault conveyed to the jailhouse informant, along with other incriminating information.

Although Perrault points to certain inconsistencies in the evidence, including the medical examiner's conclusion and the lack of gunshot residue testing on Amanda's hands, “it is axiomatic that resolving evidentiary conflicts and assessing witness credibility are within the exclusive province of the jury.” Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551, 553 (1), 783 S.E.2d 891 (2016). And it is the jury's role to determine “[w]hether an alternative hypothesis raised by the defendant is ‘reasonable.’ ” Smith, 315 Ga. at 358 (1), 882 S.E.2d 289. See also McCoy v. State, 315 Ga. 536, 542-43, 883 S.E.2d 740 (2023) (even assuming all of the evidence was circumstantial, it was sufficient as a matter of Georgia statutory law); Adkins v. State, 314 Ga. 477, 482 (2), 877 S.E.2d 582 (2022) (jury was free to reject as unreasonable defendant's theory that the victim committed suicide). The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize the jury to reject Perrault's theory that Amanda had killed herself and instead find Perrault guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.

2. Perrault next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to transfer this case to a different venue. This claim is without merit. Although Perrault filed a motion to change venue in November 2020, he expressly withdrew that motion during a pretrial hearing in February 2022 before the trial court made any ruling on the motion. Accordingly, there is nothing for this Court to review, and this enumeration of error fails.

3. In his final enumeration of error, Perrault argues that he is entitled to a new trial due to the cumulative effect of several evidentiary and other types of errors and the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Although Perrault has not separately enumerated these errors, he identifies the following: (a) law enforcement failed to maintain the chain of custody of the firearm; (b) the presence of Sheriff Sills at the prosecution table during trial violated the rule of sequestration; (c) the trial judge improperly referred to Sheriff Sills as a prosecutor; (d) the prosecutor referred to Perrault as a murderer “during the trial”; and (e) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call unidentified “key witnesses” to testify. We are not persuaded that Perrault has shown that he is entitled to a new trial on this basis.

To establish cumulative error, Perrault must show that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury's deliberation that they denied [him] a fundamentally fair trial.” Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 567-68 (6), 883 S.E.2d 773 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Perrault failed to carry this burden. Not only has he failed to separately enumerate the underlying errors he claims should cumulatively result in a new trial, he has largely failed to specify where in the record the alleged errors occurred, whether these claims were preserved for appellate review, or in what way this Court should aggregate the combination of evidentiary and non-evidentiary errors alleged. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 617 (5) n.9, 878 S.E.2d 505 (2022) (cautioning that if an appellant seeks a new trial based on cumulative errors outside of the evidentiary context, he would do well to explain why cumulative error should be so extended); Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 696 (7) (d), 820 S.E.2d 640 (2018) (because the appellant provided no citation to any evidence in the record to support his claim, and this Court could not readily identify its location, he failed to provide adequate argument and citation on appeal for this Court to conclude that the trial court erred). This Court is not required to cull the record to search for support for Perrault's claims, and we decline to do so here. See Green v. State, 300 Ga. 707, 712 (4), 797 S.E.2d 863 (2017) (declining to cull the record to review the merits of appellant's vague claims that there were “numerous matters” relating to trial counsel's performance). Accordingly, Perrault has failed to establish any error, much less cumulative error, and this enumeration fails. See Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 29 (5), 860 S.E.2d 509 (2021) (appellant's cumulative error argument fails when there are no errors to cumulate); Flood v. State, 311 Ga. 800, 808-09 (2) (d), 860 S.E.2d 731 (2021) (“[W]hen reviewing a claim of cumulative prejudice, we evaluate only the effects of matters determined to be error rather than the cumulative effect of non-errors.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

 Judgment affirmed.