The Atlanta Gleaner.

Allred v. Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. A24A1224, 2025 WL 814937 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2025)
#insurance defense #resident relative #surviving summary judgment #anyone know how to read this contract?

Summary
Stephanie Allred sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits under her parents’ Progressive insurance policy after being struck by a vehicle in December 2019. Progressive moved for summary judgment, arguing Allred was not covered because she was not a “resident relative” of her parents’ household, as required by the policy. The trial court agreed, finding Allred had established a separate residence in Georgia. Allred appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

The court held that summary judgment was improper because questions of domicile and residence—key to determining if Allred was a “resident relative”—are typically jury issues, and the evidence presented genuine factual disputes. The policy defined “relative” as a person living in the same household as the insured or an unmarried dependent child temporarily away with intent to return. The holding relied on facts showing Allred: (1) maintained a room in her parents’ Ohio home, (2) received financial support from them, (3) was an unmarried graduate student renting an apartment in Georgia, (4) visited her parents’ home occasionally, and (5) moved back with them immediately after the accident. These facts suggested she might have intended her Georgia stay to be temporary, creating a triable issue. The court emphasized that such “aggregate details” of living arrangements, including financial ties and intent, are not suitable for summary adjudication, leading to the reversal.

Opinion
Davis, Judge.

After a vehicle struck Stephanie Allred, she sought to recover damages under her parents’ automobile insurance policy. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing the policy excluded Allred. In response, Allred directed the trial court to several facts she believed justified coverage. The trial court disagreed and sided with the insurance company. Allred now appeals. Given our precedents holding that questions of domicile and residence ordinarily fall within the province of the jury, we reverse. No doubt, the evidence crucial to deciding the parties’ dispute — a family's living arrangements and whether certain family members intend to remain as a household or establish separate ones, and when a household relationship ends — is the kind of evidence (the who, what, when, and why type) that generally is not susceptible to summary adjudication.

I.

In the late hours of December 15, 2019, a vehicle struck and injured Allred as she crossed an intersection in Atlanta, Georgia. Two years later, she sued the driver of the vehicle, and served Progressive Co. Mutual Ins. Company (“Progressive”) under Georgia's uninsured motorist (“UM”) statute. [1] Progressive answered and asserted various defenses, including that Allred did not satisfy preconditions necessary for UM benefits. Afterward, the parties engaged in discovery which revealed that Allred:

(i) attended graduate school at Georgia State University, and was unmarried, single, and with no kids at the time of the collision;

(ii) rented - as opposed to owned - her apartment in Georgia;

(iii) worked as an hourly employee “on and off” at Urban Outfitters in Georgia;

(iv) visited her parents’ Ohio home two or three times [2] over a span of 18 months;

(v) drove a vehicle insured under a different policy with the premiums paid by her father; and

(vi) maintained a room in her parents’ Ohio residence.

The parties also discovered that Allred moved in with her parents immediately after the December 2019 collision.

In June 2023, Progressive moved for summary judgment. At the time of the accident, Progressive provided an automobile liability policy to Bruce Allred, Allred's father. Bruce Allred listed his wife as a “driver” and “resident relative” on the policy but not Allred. Since Bruce Allred did not list Allred on the policy, Progressive claimed she was not entitled to UM coverage. Specifically, it argued Allred did not qualify as an insured person because Allred was not her father's “relative” as defined by Progressive.

Allred saw things differently. Although she largely agreed with Progressive's factual presentation, Allred countered that she met the definition of “relative” under the insurance policy. To Allred, her permanent residence was (and has always been) with her parents whereas she intended to reside in Georgia temporarily. Consequently, the argument went, she was a resident of her parents’ household, albeit temporarily away, at the time of the collision.

To support her position, Allred pointed to numerous facts: (1) she was enrolled in graduate school at the time of the collision; (2) her father listed her as an “assigned driver” on a State Farm policy; (3) she received financial support from her parents; (4) she had a dedicated room in her parents’ Ohio residence [3]; and (5) she moved in with her parents immediately after the accident.4 According to Allred, these facts demonstrate that she qualified as a “relative.” Therefore, Allred asserts that she was entitled to UM benefits under Progressive's liability policy.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Progressive's summary judgment motion. Ultimately, it determined that the household relationship between Allred and her parents ended in 2009 and, as a result, Allred did not satisfy the definition of “relative” in 2019. “The ‘aggregate details’ of Plaintiff Allred's living arrangements[,]” the trial court wrote, “show [Allred] had established her own residence in Georgia separate from her parents.” Therefore, the trial court goes on to say, “[w]ithout any evidence showing she was a resident relative of her parents at the time of the incident, Plaintiff is not entitled to receive UM benefits, and Progressive is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II.

We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment, construe the evidence in light favorable to Allred, and give her “the benefit of all reasonable doubt.” [5]

III.

At the outset, we note that the record contains affidavits and presuit audio recordings, among other evidence. Yet — even though a “court is obliged to take account of the entire setting of the case on a Rule 56 motion[ ]” [6] — the trial court cites only Allred's deposition testimony (and no other forms of evidence). So, we similarly resolve the question of summary judgment by limiting our analysis to Allred's deposition. [7]

Everyone agrees that Allred is not a named insured on her parents’ Progressive liability policy. All agree on the policy's language and that Progressive insures resident relative children. Everyone also agrees on the applicable definition of “relative” in this case:

a person residing in the same household as you, and related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, and includes a ward, stepchild, or foster child. Your unmarried dependent children temporarily away from home will qualify as a relative if they intend to continue to reside in your household. (emphasis supplied.)

The dispute then is whether Allred qualifies as a “relative” under her parents’ Progressive liability policy.

To determine whether Allred was a resident for purposes of insurance coverage,

the aggregate details of the family's living arrangements must be considered. Of critical importance to such an analysis is whether the family members have established and maintained separate households under different managements. [8]

There are several other factors [9] that fall within the “aggregate details” umbrella, including:

• Whether the person maintains living accommodations in the insured's home; [10]

• The person's degree of independence from the insured's family; [11]

• The interconnectedness of the family members; [12] and

• The financial entanglements between the person and insured. [13]

And importantly, “residing at another place a part of the time [does not] negate[ ] a relative being a resident of the household of an insured....” [14] A person may after all “have several residences, but only one place of domicile.” [15] Still, whether Allred was a resident of her parents’ household involves mixed questions of law and fact, which are ordinarily for a jury to resolve. [16]

Here, Allred pointed to evidence creating a genuine issue of fact regarding her residence at the time of the collision. The record evidence, for example, shows that Allred maintained a room in her parents’ Ohio residence and received financial support from them. From these facts alone, a jury could conclude that Allred was a “relative” who intended to continue residing in her parents’ household.

Likewise, the jury could infer from Allred's attributes — unmarried, college-aged student with no children, renting (rather than owning) her apartment — that she intended her stay in Georgia to be temporary. At bottom, these details, including Allred's move to her parents’ home immediately after the accident, all create fact issues regarding Allred's place of domicile and residence. [17]

One reason, of course, the trial court concluded otherwise is because it read Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. McEachern [18] to suggest evidence of financial support is immaterial to the over all question of residency. But McEachern very plainly states, “financial support is an important factor in determining whether a resident of a household has established a separate household under a different head or management....” [19] True, the sentence goes on to read, “there is nothing in the enunciated principles that lends support to appellee's position that financial support for living in a different home extends the father's curtilage to that second home.” [20] But the fact still remains: financial support is baked into the “aggregate details” analysis. Putting aside evidence of financial support, there is still other evidence from which a jury could conclude that Allred was a resident of her parents’ household at the time of the collision.

IV.

Fact-laden cases concerning questions of residence and domicile are generally not appropriate for summary judgment. While there may be outlier cases, this is not one. The record evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Progressive.

Judgment reversed.

Gobeil and Pipkin, JJ., concur.

All Citations

--- S.E.2d ----, 2025 WL 814937