Georgia case law updates and legal news
Edited By George Washington

The Atlanta Gleaner.

March 03, 2023.

State v. Wood, No. A22A1453, 2023 WL 2254052 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023)
#trafficking methamphetamine #medical emergency #motion to suppress
This case is about a warrantless search for drugs performed by law enforcement in response to a medical emergency at a hotel room. Trial court granted the motion to suppress. Court of Appeals AFFIRMS.

The trial court found that on November 2, 2020, Carter called 911 to report that Wood had possibly overdosed and needed emergency services at their hotel room in Villa Rica, Georgia. Villa Rica Police Officer Rachel Seager arrived at the scene, saw Wood lying unresponsive on the hotel room floor, and began providing emergency care to him. Carter told Officer Seager that Wood had used methamphetamine the night before and that orange pills lying on a nightstand were the prescription drug Flexeril. Emergency medical technicians arrived a few minutes later, took over providing medical assistance to Wood, and carried him out of the room.

Officer Seager, who had left the hotel room when Wood was removed, returned to the room, began questioning Carter, and observed a bag containing residue of suspected methamphetamine. Officer Seager left the room again and spoke to her superior officer, Corporal Spencer Crawford, who advised her that they could not arrest anyone based on the 911 call. Officer Seager nevertheless went back into the room; conversed further with Carter; and asked another officer who was also inside the room, Officer Chase Gordy, to take pictures and to open a cigarette box on the nightstand. Officer Gordy opened both the cigarette box and a knotted black bag that was on the nightstand, finding suspected methamphetamine inside the black bag.

Officer Seager reported the black bag's contents to Corporal Crawford, but he again instructed her that as a matter of law they could not do anything. Officer Seager returned to the hotel room, and Officer Gordy, who was still inside the room, began opening other bags in the room. Officer Seager then placed Carter under arrest and moved her to the officer's patrol vehicle. Officers continued searching the hotel room, finding a blow torch, tubing, and two magnetic boxes under a blanket.

Officer Seager went to her patrol vehicle and asked Carter if the items found under the blanket were used for a meth lab, but Carter said that there was no such lab and that the items were used for smoking meth. Corporal Crawford contacted drug task force agents, who came to the scene and entered the hotel room. The task force agents confirmed that there was no active meth lab, obtained and executed a search warrant for the hotel room, and seized methamphetamine and other items from the room. Wood and Carter were subsequently charged with multiple controlled substances violations.

Exigent Circumstances: The state argues that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless searches of the hotel room. We disagree. As an initial matter, we note that the state has not contested that Wood and Carter “ha[d] a constitutionally-protected reasonable expectation of privacy in [their hotel] room, and thus the Fourth Amendment provides [them] the same protection as [they] would have for [their] private home[s].”

In this case, it is undisputed that Officer Seager's initial warrantless entry into the hotel room was lawful since she was responding to the 911 call and entered in order to render emergency assistance to Wood. Indeed, Wood concedes that the officer's first entry was reasonable and that it raised no constitutional concerns. See State v. Driggers, 306 Ga. App. 849, 851 (1)(“ ‘It has been repeatedly held that reasonable concern for a victim's welfare justifies a warrantless entry.’)

But once the emergency medical technicians arrived, took over the medical care of Wood, and removed him from the room,

the exigent circumstances authorizing [the officer's initial] entry for the limited purpose of [rendering emergency aid] had expired. An officer's conduct immediately after a legal entry must be carefully limited to achieving the objective which justified the entry: the officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance. Driggers, supra at 852 (2) (b).

As the trial court found, Officer Seager even admitted during her testimony that her obligation to render aid to Wood ceased when the emergency medical personnel arrived and she understood that her job with respect to the incident was complete after her first conversation with Corporal Crawford.

Nevertheless, Officer Seager re-entered the hotel room after that initial emergency had expired and officers conducted warrantless searches of the room. Since the medical emergency which authorized the initial warrantless entry had expired, “even if [the] officers ha[d] probable cause, absent exigent circumstances or proper consent, [the subsequent] warrantless searches and seizures within [the hotel room] by [the] officers ... [were] presumptively unreasonable.” Arp v. State, 327 Ga. App. 340, 342 (1)(2014). The state makes no claim that the officers obtained consent to search the hotel room. And as found by the trial court, there was no evidence of any such consent. So only the existence of exigent circumstances could have justified the officers in entering and searching the hotel room without a warrant.

Such exigent circumstances include where an officer is in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, where an officer reasonably fears the imminent destruction of evidence if entry into the residence is not immediately effected, and where an officer reasonably perceives that a suspect within the dwelling poses a risk of danger to the police or others. Edwards v. State, 357 Ga. App. 396, 400 (2) (2020). Here however the state has failed to show the existence of any such exigent circumstances. The state argues that the discovery of suspected meth lab items under the blanket posed a risk of danger to the police or others and thus justified the warrantless entry and search of the room. But that discovery occurred after the officers were unlawfully inside the room, and the undisputed evidence shows that there was in fact no active meth lab in the hotel room. See Edwards, supra at 401 (2) (a), (mere inchoate and unparticularized suspicion of danger is insufficient to support a warrantless search). We therefore affirm the trial court's conclusion that the state's argument “ignores fifteen minutes of unlawful police presence in the hotel room after [emergency medical services] assumed the duty of saving Defendant Wood's life” and “thus any evidence obtained as a result of law enforcement's prolonged presence was obtained unlawfully.”

The state contends that the evidence seized after law enforcement officers’ unlawful warrantless entries and searches of the hotel room was nevertheless admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule because the drug task force agents later obtained a search warrant for the room. But for this exception to apply, “there must be a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, and the prosecution must demonstrate that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.” Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 76 (4) (b) (2019). “This active pursuit rule ... prevent[s] application of the inevitable discovery doctrine from emasculating the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Edwards, supra at 399 (1).

A “search warrant issued upon probable cause may be a lawful means to discover evidence.” Mobley, supra. But the record in this case does not show that officers were actively pursuing a search warrant at the times they entered the hotel room and began searching it without a warrant. Absent proof that the officers were actively pursuing a warrant at [those] point[s] in time, the mere fact that [drug task force agents] actually obtained a warrant [later that] day is not enough to bring this case within the inevitable discovery exception. Indeed, because a valid search warrant nearly always can be obtained after a search has occurred, allowing law enforcement to use a warrant from after-the-fact to justify an earlier search would threaten to vitiate the warrant requirement. The state has therefore “failed to lay an evidentiary foundation for the application of the inevitable discovery exception.”

The state's final enumeration of error, that the immunity from prosecution provided by OCGA § 16-13-5 does not apply to the indicted charges in this case, presents nothing for review since the trial court made no such immunity ruling. Rather, the only ruling before us is the trial court's order suppressing evidence based on the unlawful warrantless search of the hotel room. “Inasmuch as we are a court for the correction of errors, we do not consider issues which were not raised below and ruled on by the trial court.” State v. Cook, 337 Ga. App. 205, 206 (2016). AFFIRMED.

Charles v. State, No. S22A1080, 2023 WL 2123452 (Ga. Feb. 21, 2023)
#malice murder #juror irregularity #tales from the crypt
Fred Jason Charles appeals his convictions for malice murder and related offenses in connection with the July 2015 shooting death of Stephanie Daniel. Supreme Court of Georgia AFFIRMS. The trial evidence showed the following...

On July 5, 2015, Charles was living with his father, Herbert Charles (“Herbert”), at Herbert's mobile home in Calhoun, Georgia. Daniel, who was Charles's girlfriend, had been staying in Charles's portion of the mobile home for several days, and Charles's friend, Scoggins, was at the mobile home early in the day.

Around noon, Charles and Scoggins drove Daniel's Nissan Xterra down the road, stopping at a neighbor's house so Charles could show him a revolver and ask where they could shoot it. That evening, around 7:30 or 8:00, a different neighbor saw Daniel enter the mobile home. Shortly thereafter, the neighbor saw Charles throw a firecracker and then drive away in Daniel's Xterra.

Herbert went outside to retrieve his dog, who was afraid of fireworks. When he came back in, he saw Daniel lying on a bunch of clothes on the bed in Charles's bedroom and asked if she was okay. Daniel did not respond, and Herbert “figured she had just went to sleep.” But when Charles and Scoggins returned, Herbert told them to check on her, at which point the two men went into Charles's bedroom and “shut the door.”

Later, Charles and Scoggins left together in Daniel's Xterra. Between 9:21 and 11:00 p.m., Scoggins's girlfriend called Scoggins several times and overheard Scoggins tell Charles, “[D]on't shoot yourself in the toe,” and, “[I]t's loaded.”

Sometime after Charles and Scoggins left the mobile home, Herbert discovered that Daniel was still lying in the same place in Charles's bedroom, and, upon seeing blood, he called 911. Officers responded and found Daniel dead with a bullet hole in her chest and blood on her arm. Officers also found a bullet hole in one of Charles's bedroom windows, and a medical examiner testified that a wound on Daniel's upper right arm was consistent with a graze from a bullet.

In the early hours of July 6, Scoggins called his sister, Crystal Scoggins (“Crystal”), to ask for a ride. Crystal picked up Scoggins and Charles on a forestry road that intersected Manning Mill Road in the Strawberry Mountain area of Walker County, Georgia. At the end of the forestry road, officers later found a Nissan Xterra that had been burned down to the metal frame. A partial VIN number recovered from the Xterra matched that of Daniel's vehicle.

After picking up Charles and Scoggins, Crystal drove the men back to her house, where Charles made a noose with a belt. Holding the noose in Crystal's presence, he “dared [her] to say a word.” In the afternoon, Crystal and Scoggins dropped off Charles at a convenience store. Later, an officer responding to a tip about Charles's whereabouts located Charles hiding in the woods behind a trailer.

At trial, a firearms examiner testified that a bullet recovered from Daniel's body was likely fired from a revolver. Although Herbert owned a revolver, the firearms examiner ruled out Herbert's revolver as the source of the bullet that killed Daniel, and Herbert's hands tested negative for gunpowder residue. Supreme Court of Georgia affirms evidence was sufficient for conviction.

Charles argues that the trial court mishandled a potential issue of juror irregularity. The record shows that, following a 15-minute recess during Herbert's testimony, the victim's mother reported to a deputy that, during the break, a communication between her and Charles's mother had occurred in the restroom. Addressing counsel outside the presence of the jury, the court reported:

I was advised just a moment ago, during the break, apparently there were some jurors in the ladies restroom. That the victim’s mother was in the restroom and apparently the mother of one of the Defendant’s. In which, the Court understands, the victim’s mother said something to the – or the defendant's mother said something to the victim’s mother, apologizing for this happening. Which the Court assumes the jury heard, those members of the jury who were in the restroom at the time, heard that conversation.

In response, Charles and Scoggins moved for a mistrial, arguing that any exposure to an apology was prejudicial because it could indicate guilt.

The court then asked the victim's mother to come forward and describe the conversation that had occurred in the restroom. She stated that Charles's mother “just said that she was sorry and she wished it could have been her.” When asked if there was “any conversation about what may have happened,” the victim's mother nodded her head “negatively.”

The court then asked Charles's mother to come forward and describe the conversation she had with the victim's mother. Charles's mother said, “I just – she was crying and I just hugged her and told her that I was so sorry. And if I could have took her daughter’s place I would.” When asked if “[t]hat's the total extent of the conversation,” Charles's mother stated, “That was it.” The court asked “[h]ow many jurors were in the restroom at the time,” and Charles's mother responded, “I didn't know that there was any. I'm sorry. I thought they had all walked out. All I seen was her at the sink washing her hands, crying.”

Charles's counsel argued that “[w]e need to find out how many jurors were in there” because what Charles's mother had said was “an indication of guilt.” The court stated that it was “sorry [the conversation had] happened” but that the court did not believe the conversation caused prejudice warranting a mistrial because an “[e]xpression of sympathy, in and of itself for something that happened to someone, is not an expression of admission of guilt by your client” and would not give rise to “an inference [by] ... a juror that that person is admitting that a defendant committed the offense for which [he is] being charged.”

The court then brought the jury back in, and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Members of the jury, the Court has been advised that there is the possibility that some members of the jury may have overheard a conversation during the break, involving people not on the jury. The Court is concerned that if that – if there was a conversation overheard, that it would have an impact on that juror or those jurors that may have heard a conversation, to the extent that it would adversely impact that juror[’]s deliberations.

I'm going to ask the jury as a whole, to whether there is any member of this jury, that heard any conversation, any matter that may be related to this case, to which you would be unable to totally disregard, forget about it, and it have no bearing on your decisions.

If there is any member of the jury who cannot do that, if you would please indicate to the Court.

ALL JURORS: No response.

THE COURT: There is no member of the jury who indicated any conversation, if they overheard one, if the conversation was overheard, which would have any impact on their decision making process, so that they would not be able to totally disregard that remark. All right. Get your witness.

A bench conference immediately followed this exchange, during which Charles's counsel argued, “Your Honor, you asked if any conversation [occurred] that would impact the jurors, [but] I think the question is to ask[ ] if anybody overheard a conversation.” The court responded that it had “included that [language]. I said, if there was any juror who overheard any conversation, if any, did that conversation have any impact.” The court then denied the defendants’ motion for mistrial, stating, “I think the [c]ourt[’]s instructions were appropriate.”

On appeal, Charles argues that “the trial court abused its discretion in failing to inquire more specifically whether any jurors overheard the conversation and what impact it might have had on them.” According to Charles, “the trial court offered a blanket instruction and asked if jurors could follow it” without determining “whether any of [the jurors] heard the conversation and what particular things they heard.” Charles further argues that, if jurors overheard the conversation, they could have inferred from the apology and expression of remorse that Charles's mother believed Charles had killed the victim.

Charles is correct that the wording of the court's yes-or-no question appears to have impaired the court's ability to determine whether any juror overheard the restroom conversation and thus whether any juror irregularity might have occurred. The court's question to the jurors was compound, asking them both whether they had overheard a conversation related to the case and whether they could disregard such a conversation. As a result, the jurors’ lack of a response to the question might have indicated either that the jurors had not overheard the conversation in the restroom or that they had overheard the conversation but believed they could disregard what they heard.

Nevertheless, under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to determine whether jurors were exposed to the extra-judicial conversation between Charles's mother and the victim's mother. Through its questioning of the two mothers, the court established that “the total extent” of the conversation in the restroom was limited to Charles's mother stating that she “was so sorry” for the victim's mother's loss and that Charles's mother would have traded “place[s]” with the victim if she could. The victim's mother further confirmed that there was no discussion of “what may have happened” to the victim. Based on the record, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the extra-judicial statements were mere expressions of sympathy for what had happened to the victim, as opposed to an apology for any role Charles may have played in the victim's death, and that the expressions of sympathy did not give rise to an inference that Charles's mother believed Charles had committed the offenses for which he was being charged. It follows that any juror irregularity that might have occurred “was an immaterial irregularity without opportunity for injury” and thus that the record “establish[ed] beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred.”

Court of Appeals also affirms trial court denying pretrial motion to bifurcate the trial and try separately the charges for which Defendant’s status as a felon was material; and that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State using a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge as a predicate for felony murder.