Georgia case law updates and legal news
Edited By George Washington

The Atlanta Gleaner.

January 26, 2023.

BUCHANAN v. HANNON., No. A22A1650, 2023 WL 369325 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2023)
#wills and estates #will construction #family feud
This case involves the interpretation of a will. Specifically whether decedent intended to bequeath his entire residence to his daughter or divide it between his daughter and niece.

The record shows that in 2017 Gloster L. Buchanan executed his last will and testament. At the time, Gloster's wife, Celia Buchanan, was alive, as were his only child, Carol Ramona Buchanan, and three grandchildren. Gloster also had a niece, Samille Hannon

In Item XVIII of the will, titled Specific Devise of Homeplace, Gloster bequeathed his residence as follows:

  1. I give and devise to CELIA M. BUCHANAN, if she shall survive me, any interest which I own at the time of my death in the house and lot which I occupy as my residence at the time of my death.

  2. If she shall not survive me, then I give and bequeath said property to CAROL RAMONA BUCHANAN, provided she survives me.

  3. If she shall not survive me, then I give, devise and bequeath all the property to CAROL RAMONA BUCHANAN and SAMILLE HANNON, provided they survive me.

  4. If my said daughter or niece fail to survive me, but have living lineal descendants who survive them, such descendants shall take per stirpes the share their parent would have taken had she survived me.

Celia died in March 2019. Gloster died in June 2019. Later that year Carol as executor of Gloster's estate probated her father's will.

In January 2021, the niece Samille Hannon filed this declaratory judgment action against Carol, in her capacity as executor, alleging that Lines 2 and 3 of Item XVIII in Gloster's will are in conflict regarding distribution of his homeplace. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment asking the trial court to construct the will as a matter of law. The ultimate issue is who Gloster was referring to by the first use of “she” in Line 3. If that “she” refers to Celia, as Hannon claims, then Line 2 and Line 3 paradoxically provide for Carol to receive the homeplace 100% in the first instance and split the property 50/50 with Hannon in the second.

If it seems obvious that “she” in Line 3 refers to the potential of a deceased Carol, it also seems strange that Line 3 would name Carol as inheriting half of the property, versus her heirs or descendants, since Line 4 makes that designation.

Hannon argued Line 2 and Line 3 were merely a direct conflict that under principles of will construction must be resolved by giving effect only to the later sentence. Arguing ambiguity in Item XVIII, Carol argued the court should consider parol evidence to determine Gloster's intent. Carol submitted affidavits from herself and Gloster's lawyer averring that Gloster intended to bequeath the residence solely to Carol. Hannon maintained no ambiguity, but submitted her own affidavits stating that Gloster meant to devise the residence to Carol and her equally. 

The trial court agreed with Hannon's interpretation of the will, ruling that “the second and third sentences are not ambiguous, but contradictory devises that cannot be reconciled.” Accordingly, the court resolved the contradiction by only giving effect to Line 3. Carol appealed.

Court of Appeals REVERSES. The first “she” in Line 2 refers to Celia. Carol inherits the property if Gloster’s wife predeceases him and Carol survives him. The first “she” in Line 3 refers to Carol. Therefore Line 3 only comes into play if Carol predeceases Gloster (never).

Court of Appeals held this is the most reasonable interpretation of Item XVIII:

  • First it is the grammatically preferable construction. The first “she” in the third sentence must refer to Carol because Carol is the female identified by name immediately before that pronoun.

  • Second this interpretation gives effect to both the second and third sentences: the second sentence sets forth what happens if Celia fails to survive Gloster (Carol inherits), and the third sentence explains what happens if Carol also fails to survive Gloster (Carol and Hannon inherit). 

  • Third this interpretation honors the principle that, in construing a will, courts should look to that interpretation which carries out the provisions of the statute of distribution, rather than that which defeats them; that, in the absence of anything in the will to the contrary, the presumption is that the ancestor intended that his property should go where the law of intestacy carries it, which is supposed to be the channel of natural descent. To interrupt or disturb this descent or direct it in a different course should require plain words to that effect.

The Court noted this interpretation arguably renders Line 3 problematic, as it would require Carol to inherit one-half of the property if she were no longer living. However because the event of Carol predeceasing Gloster did not occur, the Court did not reach this issue.

Wright v. State, No. S22A1117, 2023 WL 210508 (Ga. Jan. 18, 2023)
#criminal law #capital crimes #bizarre
The evidence at trial showed the following. On May 13, 2017 at 12:50 a.m. a Coffee County 911 operator received a “hang-up” call and called the number back. It rang four times before the defendant Walter Russell Wright answered. Wright told the operator that Oletha Brady had shot herself with his gun. Wright said he didn’t know how she got it because he wore it “by his foot.” 

Sheriff's deputies responded to the home within 10 minutes of the 911 call. When Wright opened the door, the deputies saw Brady lying face-up on the living room floor with a gunshot wound to her torso. Taurus .38 Special revolver on the floor near her body. The .38 Special contained four live rounds and one fired shell.

Wright told one of the deputies that he and Brady were having sex on the couch when the gun in his ankle holster “went off.” The deputy observed the empty gun holster strapped to Wright’s ankle. Wright also gave a second version of the events at the scene to deputies. That while he and Brady were having sex on the couch, Brady got his gun and shot herself. A bullet was later recovered from a blood-stained couch cushion.

At trial, a paramedic who arrived at the home shortly after the deputies arrived testified that Brady was wearing a nightgown and that her body was cold to the touch, her skin was turning gray, she had no pulse, and she was not breathing. The paramedic further testified that she had never seen a body that was cold to the touch and with graying skin within 15 minutes after an injury had occurred. A GBI forensic firearms examiner testified that the .38 Special found next to Brady's body would not fire “without the trigger being pulled and held to the rear.”

The medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Brady was admitted as an expert in forensic pathology and testified at trial as follows. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to the torso, which entered the center of Brady's chest just below the breastbone and exited through her back. When the gun was fired, it was anywhere from a few inches to three feet away. The medical examiner concluded that the manner of death was homicide rather than accident or suicide, based on her experience as a medical examiner and her examination of multiple gunshot wound cases involving homicide, accident, and suicide.

After being taken into custody, Wright waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and was interviewed twice by law enforcement officers. The interviews were video-recorded and played for the jury. According to Wright, he and Brady lived next to each other and had been in an on-and-off relationship for six years, but the relationship had ended. On the evening of the shooting, Wright was outside his home when Brady walked by and invited him over. The two began drinking — and talking about Wright’s relationships with other women. According to Wright, he was involved with three other women and these relationships were “causing issues.”

Wright then provided three conflicting accounts of Brady's death. In one version, Brady wanted to have sex, but he declined because he was involved with someone else. He went to the bathroom and when he came out, he heard a pop and saw Brady lying on the living room floor with a gunshot wound. In the second version, he and Brady were having sex on the couch when the gun in his ankle holster discharged. In Wright’s final version, he was sitting on the floor in the living room taking his shoes off when he removed the gun from his ankle holster and he saw that the gun was cocked. He attempted to lower the hammer, but the gun accidentally discharged. Brady, who was standing in the kitchen behind him, was struck by the bullet. Wright elected not to testify at trial, but he called three witnesses who testified that he had a reputation for peacefulness, honesty, and abiding by the law.

Wright was convicted of felony murder. Georgia Supreme Court AFFIRMS. On appeal, Wright argued the trial court erred in its instruction on good character evidence because it failed to inform the jury that good character is a substantive fact that in and of itself may create a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt and lead to an acquittal.

The trial court instructed the jury as follows, substantially tracking the current pattern instruction:

  • “You have heard the evidence of the character of the defendant for particular traits, more specifically, honesty, peacefulness, and being law-abiding in an effort to show the defendant likely acted in keeping with such character or trait at pertinent times or with reference to issues in this case. This evidence has been offered in the form of opinions of other witnesses and their testimony as to the defendant's reputation. You shall consider any such evidence, along with all the other - other evidence in deciding whether or not you have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the defendant.”

Georgia Supreme Court applied the plain error analysis because Wright did not object at trial. The Court has previously rejected the contention that omitting the “substantive fact” language renders the good-character instruction inadequate. Nor could Wright establish that the alleged error was clear and beyond reasonable dispute. Accordingly, Wright’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the charge also failed. And the evidence was sufficient to support conviction.