Georgia case law updates and legal news
Edited By George Washington

The Atlanta Gleaner.

January 19, 2023.

United States v. Garza, No. 21-13294, 2023 WL 193713 (11th Cir. Jan. 17, 2023)
#11th circuit #sentencing guidelines #drug charges #safety-valve reduction
In the Middle District of Florida, Garza pled guilty to: (1) conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine; (2) distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine; and (3) possessing with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine.

Garza’s guideline range was one hundred twenty months’ imprisonment. Garza sought “safety valve” relief to reduce his sentence. The "safety valve" sentence reduction allows defendants to be eligible for a sentence reduction by truthfully providing all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.

The government opposed Garza's eligibility for safety valve relief, arguing that he failed to disclose everything he knew about the conspiracy. Critically important was the source for the methamphetamine. The government specifically argued that Garza was indicted for conspiring with “other persons, both known and unknown,” and that the conspiracy included the unknown participants in Garza's “chain of distribution.” The district court agreed and found Garza ineligble for the safety valve sentence reduction.

Eleventh Circuit AFFIRMS. They call the “safety valve” reduction the “tell all” provision. A defendant's “refusal to reveal his source” of the drugs after pleading guilty to a drug conspiracy offense is failing to “truthfully provide the government with all of the information he had concerning the offense” and disqualifies him from safety valve relief.

Garza conceded that he didn't disclose information about the source of the methamphetamine. The district court's finding that he failed to “tell all” was not clearly erroneous.

Simmons v. Bates, No. A22A1460, 2023 WL 178263 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2023)
#personal injury #wrongful death #time-limited demand
On July 27, 2018 Judy Simmons ran a stop sign and struck another car, which resulted in severe and ultimately fatal injuries to Deborah Bates. Simmons, who was allegedly the at-fault driver, had insurance policies through two companies, Progressive Premier Insurance Company and ACCC Insurance Company. 

On June 20, 2019, plaintiff attorneys on behalf of Jimmy Bates (Deborah's surviving spouse) and Donna K. Martin (Administrator of Deborah's Estate), sent an offer of compromise letter to Progressive and ACCC in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (the “First Offer”). The parties dispute whether there was a valid acceptance of this offer such that there is a binding settlement agreement. The trial court denied Simmons’ motion to enforce settlement. Court of Appeals AFFIRMS.

The First Offer was 39 pages long and contained 30 footnotes. It stated that it was a contingent offer which only obligated Bates to settle if the offer was unequivocally accepted by both ACCC and Progressive. ACCC never received, and thus never accepted, the First Offer. The letter was returned to plaintiff attorneys as undeliverable.

Progressive sent a letter of acceptance on July 16, 2019, agreeing to all terms. On July 29, 2019, Progressive sent: (1) a check for $100,000; (2) Simmons’ affidavit in which she averred she had no other insurance policy under which coverage was available; and (3) a general release for Bates to execute. 

Plaintiffs refused to follow through on the settlement. Plaintiff counsel wrote “while we appreciate Progressive's offer of compromise, for multiple reasons, we must respectfully decline at this time.” The letter explained the returned letter to ACCC and plaintiffs were unwilling to compromise the claim only as to Progressive.

On October 22, 2019, plaintiff counsel sent Progressive and ACCC a second offer of settlement letter, which was now 41 pages long (the “Second Offer”). This offer contained much of the same language as the first settlement offer, but Simmons did not accept or attempt to accept the Second Offer.

On January 23, 2020, plaintiffs filed suit. Simmons then moved to enforce the settlement agreement, asserting she had unequivocally accepted the First Offer. Plaintiff counsel objected, arguing that Simmons’ purported acceptance was not identical to the terms of the First Offer, and that the First Offer was contingent on ACCC's acceptance, which did not happen.

The trial court denied the motion to enforce the settlement. Specifically, the trial court found Simmons had not unequivocally accepted Bates’ First Offer because:

  • the release “excluded the consideration of the Affidavit or the sworn and notarized statement that there is no other insurance.” 

  • Further, although Progressive provided the correct affidavit, the failure to mention the affidavit in the release varied the terms thus constituted a rejection of the offer. 

  • Also, Simmons included additional language in the release, namely the inclusion of a line for a notary to sign and to indicate that Bates signed the release freely.

The trial court determined that the argument concerning the effect of ACCC's non-acceptance of the First Offer was moot.

Court of Appeals AFFIRMS, but for different reasons. Regardless of whether Progressive complied with the terms of the First Offer, it was undisputedly not accepted by ACCC, and thus no settlement agreement was reached. It was not Progressive's fault that ACCC did not receive the First Offer, which will be relevant in the event of a bad faith refusal to settle claim.

January 17, 2023.

Smith v. State, No. A23A0371, 2023 WL 165224 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2023)
#criminal law #traffic citation #motion to quash
Brande Smith was charged with improper/erratic lane change in violation of OCGA § 40-6-123 (a). The citation in this case contains a section titled “OFFENSE (Other than above)” and asks the officer to specify the name of the offense and the violated Code section, along with a section for any “REMARKS.” Below these sections, a table sets forth a number of options to check providing information like weather, road, traffic, lighting, commercial vehicle and where the offense occurred.

Within the “OFFENSE” section the officer typed in “IMPROPER/ERRATIC LANE CHANGE” and specified that Smith was in violation of “Code Section 40-6-123 (a)” in “CLAYTON” County on “RIVERDALE RD” “at/on (secondary location) E I285 RAMP.”

Smith made an oral motion to quash on the issue of whether “IMPROPER/ERRATIC LANE CHANGE”, as alleged by the citation, alleges the essential elements of the offense (in this case OCGA § 40-6-123 (a), the improper lane change statute).

Trial court denied the motion. Court of Appeals REVERSES. Merely stating that Smith made an “improper” lane change states a legal conclusion, not an allegation of fact. Second, while the phrase “erratic lane change” in the citation alleges some facts, it does not allege the facts necessary to establish a violation of OCGA § 40-6-123 because it does not contain an essential element of the offense — that Smith changed lanes without first ascertaining that such movement could be made “with reasonable safety.” 

That Smith made an erratic lane change does not necessarily mean such maneuver was not reasonably safe within the meaning of the statute. The citation was substantively defective.

Williams v. Harvey, No. A22A1550, 2023 WL 164766 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2023)
#Confederate monuments #standing
The Sons of Confederate Veterans (“SOCV”) filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief against the City of Brunswick, alleging that the City's vote to remove a Confederate monument was done in violation of OCGA § 50-3-1. OCGA § 50-3-1 makes it unlawful for local government entities to remove certain historic monuments, including those honoring the Confederacy.

SOCV argued they have standing because:

  • members hold services at the monument,

  • invested funds into the monument's restoration,

  • had money on hand for future restoration of the monument,

  • and received a quit claim deed and bill of sale for the monument from the local chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy.

The trial court ultimately concluded the Sons of Confederate Veterans lacked standing and dismissed the action. Court of Appeals AFFIRMS.

The Sons of Confederate Veterans did not allege that they are citizens, residents, or taxpayers of the City of Brunswick or in other words stakeholders to whom the City owes the duty created by OCGA § 50-3-1. The court cites Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 880 S.E.2d 168 (Ga. 2022), where the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded the same SOCV failed to show associational standing by alleging the group “included members that would have citizen/resident/taxpayer standing on their own.”